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Abstract
After the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced the Basel III
framework in 2010, individual countries confronted the question of how best to implement
the framework given their unique circumstances. Switzerland, with a banking industry that
is both heavily concentrated and very large relative to the size of its overall economy, faced
a special challenge. It ultimately adopted what is sometimes referred to as the “Swiss Finish”
to Basel III—enhanced requirements applicable to Switzerland’s “too-big-to-fail” banks
Credit Suisse and UBS that go beyond the base requirements established by the BCBS. Yet
the prominent role played by relatively new contingent convertible capital (CoCos) in the
Swiss Finish, coupled with the fact that banks are allowed to use their own internal models
in determining whether requirements are met may call into question the extent to which the
Swiss Finish to Basel III represents a meaningful enhancement to the risk-based capital
requirements of the Basel framework.
__________________________________________________________________
This module is one of seven produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) examining issues
related to Basel III. The other modules in this series are:
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Basel III A: Regulatory History
Basel III B: Basel III Overview.
Basel III C: Internal Risk Models
Basel III E: Synthetic Financing by Prime Brokers
Basel III F: Callable Commercial Paper
Basel III G: Shadow Banking and Project Finance
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1. Introduction
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory
standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. Having identified three factors as
playing a crucial role in fueling the crisis (capital, liquidity, and interconnectedness), the
BCBS introduced the Basel III framework in 2010 to address these issues. Under Basel III,
banks would be required to improve both the quantity and quality of their capital based on
the extent of their risk-weighted assets (RWA). They also would be required to meet new
liquidity standards. Those banks deemed most important from a systemic standpoint would
be subject to further requirements.
When the Basel III standards were promulgated by the BCBS, individual countries
confronted the question of how best to implement them given their unique national
circumstances. Switzerland, with a banking industry that is both heavily concentrated and
very large relative to the size of its overall economy, arguably faced a special challenge. It
ultimately adopted what is sometimes referred to as the “Swiss Finish” to Basel III—
enhanced requirements applicable to Switzerland’s “too-big-to-fail” banks Credit Suisse and
UBS that go beyond the base requirements established by the BCBS.
Yet a significant portion of the enhanced requirements of the Swiss Finish can be satisfied
using relatively new contingent convertible capital (CoCos). The fact that the lossabsorbency capacity of such hybrid debt instruments has not been tested during a financial
crisis means that it is not clear the enhanced capital requirements of the Swiss Finish will
prove sufficiently protective. Furthermore, because the risk-based capital requirements of
Basel III and the Swiss Finish are based on the calculation of individual banks’ RWA and
banks are allowed to use their own internal models in calculating RWA, there is some
concern that the requirements can be met through more aggressive modeling rather than
actual reductions in risk or increases in capital. Indeed, while both Credit Suisse and UBS
have reported sharp drops in RWA since the introduction of Basel III and the Swiss Finish,
some wonder to what extent these drops are genuine. This issue raises important questions
about whether allowing banks to rely on internal models for calculating RWA leaves such
calculations open to manipulation that could ultimately undercut the risk-based approach to
capital requirements adopted by Basel III.
The remainder of the case is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of Basel
III. Section 3 discusses the Swiss implementation of Basel III, focusing specifically on the
Swiss Finish. Section 4 discusses the calculation of RWA using internal risk models. Section
5 evaluates how Credit Suisse and UBS have responded to the Swiss Finish.
Questions
1. Is the calculation of RWA using banks’ internal risk models subject to manipulation
and, if so, how can this manipulation be addressed?
2. Does the Swiss Finish to Basel III represent a meaningful enhancement to the riskbased capital requirements of the Basel framework in light of concerns about
manipulation?
3. Is the prominent role of contingent convertible capital (CoCos) in the Swiss Finish to
Basel III problematic?

82

Basel III D

McNamara et al.

2. Overview of Basel III
Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to address three of the critical
factors the BCBS has identified as contributing to the financial crisis:
1. That troubled banks held an inadequate amount of capital and that the capital they
did hold was of an insufficient quality (Capital Reform)
2. That even adequately capitalized banks experienced difficulties due to insufficient
liquidity (Liquidity Standards)
3. That the interconnectedness of financial institutions transmitted shocks across the
financial system and the broader economy (Systemic Risk and Interconnectedness)
Capital Reform: Under Basel III, banks must improve both the quantity and quality of their
capital. The minimum ratio of common equity to RWA has been increased from 2% to 4.5%,
with total capital required to represent at least 8% of RWA. A capital conservation buffer of
2.5% and a countercyclical buffer of between 0% and 2.5% have also been introduced.
Additionally, Basel III establishes a leverage ratio requiring banks to maintain Tier 1 capital
that is at least 3% of total exposure.
Liquidity Standards: Basel III introduces two new liquidity measurements. Under the
Liquidity Coverage Ratio, banks must maintain a sufficient quantity of high-quality liquid
assets to cover expected outflows in a 30-day stressed funding scenario. The Net Stable
Funding Ratio, on the other hand, compares available funding sources with the funding
needs associated with the banks’ assets and exposures over a one-year period.
Systemic Risk and Interconnectedness: Basel III includes several measures aimed at
addressing the threat of contagion given the interconnectedness that exists in the financial
markets. Higher capital requirements have been given to systemic derivatives and interfinancial exposures, and a capital surcharge of 1% to 2.5% in common equity has been
introduced for banks deemed systemically important. (For a more detailed discussion of
Basel III, see YPFS Case Study McNamara, et al. 2014B.)

3. The Swiss Implementation of Basel III
Risk-Based Capital
Basel III’s requirements are being phased in over time, with a targeted completion date of
2019 and interim deadlines along the way. Different countries have made varying degrees of
progress in implementing Basel III. In Switzerland, the implementation of Basel III began
with an amendment to the country’s Capital Adequacy Ordinance (CAO) effective January 1,
2013. Under the CAO as amended, Swiss banks must meet the minimum risk-based capital
standards established by Basel III—total capital equal to 8.0% of RWA, with a minimum of
4.5% held in the form of Common Equity Tier 1 and a minimum of 6.0% held in the form of
Tier 1 Capital. Additionally, consistent with the requirements of Basel III, the CAO
established a 2.5% capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical buffer of up to 2.5%,
each to be met with Common Equity Tier 1. The CAO also empowered the Swiss Financial
Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) to require additional capital. (To review the basic
risk-based capital requirements established by the Swiss, see pages 14 and 15 of CAO 2012.)
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While the risk-based capital requirements outlined above apply to Swiss banks generally,
the Swiss banking industry represents an extreme example of consolidation and magnitude
relative to the size of the host economy. Switzerland’s two largest banks— Credit Suisse and
UBS— account for nearly 40% of the domestic credit market and have combined total assets
over four times the size of the nation’s gross domestic product (Financial Stability Board
2012, 9).
Figure 1: Total Assets of the Banking Sector to GDP (year-end 2010)

Source: Financial Stability Board 2012, 9.

Given how critical Credit Suisse and UBS are to both the Swiss banking industry and its
overall economy, difficulties the institutions faced during the financial crisis highlighted the
need to strengthen their resiliency. UBS in particular, which had substantial exposure to the
U.S. subprime market as the crisis began, incurred significant losses, ultimately resulting in
the creation of a stabilization fund by Swiss authorities in October 2008 to absorb up to $60
billion in illiquid assets from the bank’s balance sheet.
In response to the lessons of the financial crisis, the Swiss adopted a “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF)
package intended to reduce the need for future government intervention (sometimes known
as the “Swiss Finish” to Basel III). Under the TBTF approach, banks deemed systemically
important (initially only Credit Suisse and UBS, but now including two additional Swiss
banks) must, in addition to meeting the 4.5% minimum Common Equity Tier 1 ratio
applicable to all banks, maintain a capital buffer of 8.5% of RWA comprised of Common
Equity Tier 1 and up to 3% of contingent convertible capital (CoCos) that is triggered when
eligible Common Equity Tier 1 falls below 7% of RWA (commonly referred to as Recovery
CoCos). Furthermore, systemically important banks must maintain a progressive component
ranging from 1% to approximately 6% of RWA based on a progression rate set annually by
FINMA and tied to size and market share. This progressive component can be satisfied with
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CoCos that are triggered once eligible Common Equity Tier 1 falls below 5% (commonly
referred to as Resolution CoCos). (See Figure 2 for detail.)
Significantly, while the total risk-based capital requirement for a systemically important
Swiss bank can reach upwards of approximately 19% of RWA, only 10% of RWA must be in
the form of Common Equity Tier 1. The remainder can come from CoCos, hybrid debt
instruments that can absorb bank losses by converting to equity or otherwise being reduced
in principal upon the occurrence of a contractually specified trigger (in the case of the Swiss
Finish, when Common Equity Tier 1 falls below 7% of RWA and below 5% of RWA). Triggers
are typically set so that when they are reached by an issuer, it is an indicator that the issuer
is in financial distress and may have difficulty raising needed additional capital from the
markets. The equity conversion or principal reduction that automatically occurs once the
trigger is reached provides this needed additional capital. As a result, CoCos are seen by
many regulators as an acceptable means of satisfying capital requirements. Under the Basel
III framework itself, for instance, CoCos can qualify as Additional Tier 1 Capital or Tier 2
Capital depending upon their trigger levels (low-trigger CoCos are less able to absorb losses
and are therefore classified as Tier 2 Capital, while high-trigger CoCos absorb more losses
and are classified as Additional Tier 1 Capital) (Avdjiev et al 2013). The prominent role given
to CoCos in the Swiss Finish may have led Swiss banks to become the second largest issuer
of CoCos in the world since 2009. (See Figure 3.)
Figure 2: TBFT Risk-Based Capital Requirements as Compared with Those Set Forth in Basel
III

Source: FINMA.
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Figure 3: Total CoCos since 2009 by Issuing Country (US$ Billions)

Source: Avdjiev et al 2013.

Yet the emergence of CoCos is a relatively new phenomenon, and the financial instrument’s
capacity for absorbing losses has not yet been tested in the context of a financial crisis. For
example, triggers based on Common Equity Tier 1 can only be activated as quickly and as
frequently as this value can be officially calculated and publicly disclosed, which may only be
quarterly. In a fast-moving financial crisis, this activation may not occur in time. Thus, it is
not entirely clear how protective the enhanced capital requirements of the Swiss Finish
would be given the heavy reliance on CoCos. (To review the risk-based capital requirements
of the Swiss TBTF approach, see pages 35 through 38 of CAO 2013.)
Leverage Ratio
In addition to the risk-based capital requirements outlined above, the Swiss implementation
of Basel III also includes a non-risk-based leverage ratio for systemically important banks.
Rather than establishing a fixed minimum ratio, however, the Swiss approach sets the
required leverage ratio at 24% of the specific risk-based capital requirements applicable to
a particular bank. Thus, a hypothetical systemically important bank with a 4.5% minimum
capital requirement, 8.5% capital buffer and 3% progressive component would have a
minimum required leverage ratio of 3.8% of “total commitment” ([4.5% + 8.5% + 3%] * .24).
(To review the leverage ratio requirements of the Swiss TBTF approach, see pages 38 and
39 of CAO 2012.)

4. The Calculation of Risk-Weighted Assets
The risk-based capital requirements associated with the Basel III regime necessitate the
calculation of RWA for each financial institution subject to the requirements. Under the Basel
III framework, this calculation is performed based on three distinct categories of risk:
•

Credit Risk—risk stemming from a borrower or other counterparty not making
payments as required

•

Market Risk—risk stemming from movements in market prices
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•

Operational Risk—risk stemming from inadequate or failed internal processes,
people and systems or from external events

For each category of risk, Basel II established multiple calculation methodologies from which
financial institutions may choose (subject in some instances to regulatory approval) that are
still in use under Basel III. For instance, in determining Credit Risk, banks may use a
Standardized Approach based on standardized risk weights established by Basel for various
categories of assets. Banks’ task under the Standardized Approach is to determine into which
risk-weight buckets each of their assets should be placed. As an example, corporate debt that
has been rated is assigned a risk weight from 20% (for AAA to AA- minus debt) to 150% (for
below BB- debt) (Bank for International Settlements 2006, 23).
Alternatively, subject to regulatory approval, banks may opt for the Internal Ratings-Based
Approach to determining Credit Risk. Under the IRB Approach, banks rely on their own
internal estimates of the risk associated with given assets rather than on standardized risk
weights. Banks must first categorize their assets by asset class (corporate, sovereign, bank,
retail, or equity) and then, in general, determine the probability of default (under the
Foundation IRB Approach, in which regulators determine the other risk components) or the
probability of default, loss given default, exposure at default, and effective maturity (under
the Advanced IRB Approach) associated with the assets.
The other types of risk included in the RWA determination offer similar choices between
methodologies based on standardized calculations and methodologies in which banks must
rely on their own internal estimates. Operational Risk can be calculated using the Basic
Indicator Approach (based on a fixed percentage of gross income), the Standardized
Approach (based on a fixed percentage of gross income generated by different business
lines) or the Advanced Measurement Approaches (based on the determinations of a firm’s
own internal operational risk management system). Similarly, Market Risk can be calculated
using the Standardized Measurement Method (based on fixed capital charges assigned to
different types of securities) or the Internal Models Approach (based on determinations of a
firm’s own internal models). (For a complete discussion of the use of internal risk models,
see YPFS Case Study Basel III C: Internal Risk Models.)
Given the potential for manipulation inherent in allowing banks to use their own internal
estimates in making the RWA calculations that will in turn determine the risk-based capital
thresholds that they must meet, banks must satisfy a number of requirements in order to use
the internal approaches. For example, there are a number of separate categories of
requirements that must be met before banks can use the IRB Approach to calculating credit
risk, including rating system design, risk rating system operations, corporate governance
and oversight, and validation of internal estimates. According to the BCBS, the use of the IRB
Approach to calculating credit risk requires a bank to “demonstrate to its supervisor that it
meets certain minimum requirements at the outset and on an ongoing basis,” with a focus
on “banks’ abilities to rank order and quantify risk in a consistent, reliable and valid fashion”
(Bank for International Settlements 2006, 89). (For a complete description of the different
categories of risk underlying the RWA calculation and the various methodologies that can be
used in making the calculation, see pages 19 through 209 of Bank for International
Settlements 2006.)
Notwithstanding the requirements established by Basel for using internal estimates for
calculating RWA, some commentators see the potential for manipulation being realized in a
way that vitiates the risk-based capital requirements regime. While noting that the
introduction of methodologies based on internal estimates was done with understandable
intentions (to reduce incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage and create incentives to
upgrade risk management), Andrew Haldane, Executive Director of Financial Stability at the
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Bank of England, has argued that “self-assessment has created incentives to shade reported
capital ratios” (Haldane 2013, 1). Haldane concludes, “[t]he aggregate evidence is consistent
with [shading downwards risk weights or switching to lower risk-weight asset categories to
boost capital ratios] having occurred secularly and on a significant scale” (Ibid., 3). Reported
reductions in RWA and resulting increases in capital ratios must thus be examined with this
alternative explanation in mind.

5. The Response of Credit Suisse and UBS
With the ostensibly enhanced risk-based capital requirements of the Swiss TBTF approach
and the consequent added pressure to reduce RWA, an analysis of the responses of Credit
Suisse and UBS to Basel III and the Swiss Finish in light of concerns about banks “marking
their own exams” (as Haldane puts it) is worthwhile (2013). In the wake of Basel III and the
Swiss Finish, both Credit Suisse and UBS announced significant strategic decisions that they
linked directly to the need to comply with the new regulatory environment. On October 30,
2012, UBS announced that it would be largely shuttering its fixed income business lines,
arguing that such business lines “[had] been rendered uneconomical by changes in
regulation and market forces” and “do not meet their cost of capital sustainably.” In the same
press release, UBS committed to a more aggressive reduction of RWA than previously
announced (UBS 2012).
Credit Suisse, on the other hand, announced in November 2011 that it would maintain its
fixed income business lines while seeking to cut the associated RWA in half. In its investor
presentation accompanying the announcement, Credit Suisse noted that a shift to Basel III
would reduce the company’s return-on-equity (ROE) from 19% to 10% absent a change to
its business model. By cutting the RWA associated with its fixed-income business lines,
Credit Suisse hoped to preserve an ROE of 17% (Credit Suisse 2011, 32-37).
To date, Swiss regulators have not taken a public position on which approach they prefer.
Mark Branson, Head of Banks for FINMA, has described his body’s role as setting “the
framework within which each bank has to operate” and then allowing them to “make their
own strategic choices.” Ultimately, Branson believes, “the markets and clients will make their
judgment and we will see which model is more successful” (International Service of the Swiss
Broadcasting Corporation 2012).
Despite their differing strategies, both Credit Suisse and UBS have had success in
significantly reducing their RWA. Credit Suisse has cut RWA from CHF$339 billion in 2011
to CHF$261 billion in 3Q 2013 (Credit Suisse 2013, 29). Similarly, UBS has reduced RWA
from CHF$301 billion in 3Q 2012 to CHF$219 billion in 3Q 2013 (UBS 2013, 2).
Yet questions remain about how exactly Credit Suisse and UBS have achieved these
reductions. Former CEO of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) and ViceChairman of FINMA Daniel Zuberbühler has raised concerns about what he sees as
inappropriately low risk weights being assigned to certain asset categories by Credit Suisse
and UBS. He notes, for example, that both Credit Suisse and UBS have assigned residential
mortgages an average risk weight of approximately 10% in using internal methodologies to
calculate RWA. This compares with a minimum risk weight of 35% for residential mortgages
in standardized approaches (Zuberbühler 2013, 108-110).
Such concerns are seemingly bolstered by data demonstrating that Credit Suisse and UBS
have a ratio of RWA to total assets (or RWA density) that is significantly lower than the ratio
of other global systemically important banks (25% vs. 50%). (See Figure 4). Some variation
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in RWA density is to be expected based on differences in business models. A recent IMF paper
identified business models as a key driver in the composition and levels of RWAs, with retail
banks such as are often found in Spain, Italy, and the U.K. having a higher RWA density than
banks from Switzerland that are heavily involved in investment banking (Le Lesle and
Avramova 2012). Still, while differences in business model may explain some of the
difference in RWA, the size of the gap could suggest that Credit Suisse and UBS are using their
internal risk models to be more aggressive in determining the risk associated with their
assets than other major financial institutions.
Figure 4: Percentage of Risk Weighted Assets to Total Assets (RWA Density)

Source: Bankscope.
Thus, while the Swiss Finish has been trumpeted in some quarters for its enhanced riskbased capital requirements, such requirements are only as strong as the methodologies for
calculating the ratios. Regulations that require banks to maintain a high level of capital
relative to RWA can be effectively undone if calculations of RWA can be artificially lowered.
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